Agency Theory by Linder, Stefan & Foss, Nicolai J.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2255895
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
 April, 2013  
   
                   Agency Theory 
 
Stefan Linder 
 
Nicolai J. Foss 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SMG WP 7/2013 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2255895
978-87-91815-12-6 
 
SMG Working Paper No. 7/2013 
April, 2013 
ISBN: 978-87-91815-89-8 
 
 
978-87-91815-23-2 
978-87-91815-24-9 978-87-91815-24-9 
978-87-91815-24-9 
978-87-91815-24-9 
978-87-91815-24-9 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Strategic Management and Globalization 
Copenhagen Business School 
Kilen, Kilevej 14A 
2000 Frederiksberg  
Denmark 
www.cbs.dk/smg 
 AGENCY THEORY 
 
 
Stefan Linder 
ESSEC Business School 
Avenue Bernard Hirsch, BP 50105 
95021 Cergy-Pontoise (Paris) / France 
linder@essec.fr 
phone: +33-1-3443-3238; fax: +33-1-3443-2811 
 
 
Nicolai J. Foss 
Department of Strategic Management and Globalization 
Copenhagen Business School 
Kilevej 14A, 2
nd
 fl. 
2000 Frederiksberg / Denmark 
njf.smg@cbs.dk 
phone: +45 3815 2562 
and  
Department of Strategy and Management 
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration 
Helleveien 30, N-5045  
Bergen; Norway 
 
April 23, 2013 
Prepared for 
Elsevier´s Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences 
 
 
Keywords: adverse selection, agency costs, compensation, conflict of interest, contracting, 
corporate governance, delegation, hidden action, hidden characteristics, incentive intensity, 
information asymmetry, informativeness, monitoring, moral hazard, motivation, nexus of 
contracts, pay-for-performance, principal-agent relationship; second-best solution. 
JEL Code: D23, D82, D86 
 
Agency Theory 
Abstract 
Agency theory studies the problems and solutions linked to delegation of tasks from 
principals to agents in the context of conflicting interests between the parties. Beginning from 
clear assumptions about rationality, contracting and informational conditions, the theory 
addresses problems of ex ante (“hidden characteristics”) as well as ex post information 
asymmetry (“hidden action”), and examines conditions under which various kinds of 
incentive instruments and monitoring arrangements can be deployed to minimize the welfare 
loss. Its clear predictions and broad applicability have allowed agency theory to enjoy 
considerable scientific impact on social science; however, it has also attracted considerable 
criticism.  [99 words] 
 
 
  
1. Foundations 
1.1 Delegation and Conflict of Interest 
A key tenet of economics is that specialization is productive. On the individual level, it is 
indeed often beneficial not to engage in a particular task oneself, but to delegate it to another 
person specializing in the task. Examples are counseling on legal matters, managing another 
person’s funds, diagnosing and advising on illnesses, and precision-grinding a cylinder or 
machine tool. Delegating such tasks may be beneficial due to lack of time or knowledge of 
how to best perform the task (Laffont and Martimort, 2001). Yet, truly reaping the benefits of 
delegating a task to another person (an “agent”) is not always easy in practice. In The Wealth 
of Nations, Adam Smith, while praising the benefits of the division of labor and 
specialization, also provides what may be the first written account of the problems of 
delegation that the division of labor gives rise to. Referring to the directors of stock 
companies who as agents of the owners specialize in the day-to-day handling of the business, 
he (Smith, 1776, p. 700) observes that  
“being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot 
well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance 
with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. 
… Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a company”. 
Thus, Smith describes how different and even conflicting interests may lead to efficiency 
losses (“neglicence and profusion”) in the context of a situation of delegation in which 
principals cannot costlessly enforce the actions they prefer their agents to take, that is, where 
“agency problems” exist. However, with few exceptions (particularly the debates of the 1930s 
on the economics of socialism and the separation of ownership and control in the modern 
corporation), awareness of agency problems in economics was virtually non-existent until the 
end of the 1960. At that time, fundamental advances in economic analysis (economics of 
uncertainty and information, mechanism design, property rights) paved the way for a rigorous 
and systematic approach to these problems. Agency theory (or, “principal-agent theory” or 
sometimes just “incentive theory”) is an integral part of contemporary microeconomics.  
The canonical set-up of the theory is this. Two self-interested individual recognize 
potential gains from a trade, in which one (i.e., the principal) delegates a physical or mental 
task to the second (i.e., the agent), whose choice of actions and/or effort level affect the 
payoffs of both parties (Grossman and Hart, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). 
The agent is paid by the principal, who assumes the role of residual claimant in the 
relationship, that is, he holds the claims to net cash flows that result from differences between 
inflows and promised payments to other claimholders (Jensen and Smith, 1985). The agent 
and the principal hold different interests. For example, top managers acting as agents’ of the 
firms’ shareholders may prefer “empire building”, perks, leisure time, and so on instead of 
maximizing shareholders’ returns (“conflict in outcome-type preferences”) (Holmström, 
1979; Jensen and Smith, 1985). Likewise, managers may prefer engaging in capital 
expenditures that maximize the survival chances of the firm that pays their salaries, while 
shareholders will likely prefer them to go for high-return, but also typically more risky 
investments as they can diversify risk (“conflict in risk preferences”) (e.g., Grossman and 
Hart, 1983). Or, yet again, managers may not plan to stay on for a long time with the firm in 
question and thus differ in the time horizon they consider in decision-making from 
(assumingly long-term oriented) shareholders (“conflict in time horizon”) (e.g., Baker, 
Gibbons and Murphy, 1994). Many other forms of conflicts of interests between the 
principal(s) and the agent(s) are obviously conceivable. All of these imply that the agent (or 
agents) may not act in the principal’s best interest. Yet, these conflicting interests only 
become problematic when combined with information being asymmetrically distributed 
between the principal(s) and the agent(s). 
1.2 Asymmetric Information, hidden characteristics, and hidden action 
The delegation of a task is often motivated by the principal lacking knowledge, 
abilities or skill to perform the task themselves, knowledge differences that explain why gains 
from trade exist in the first place. However, it also implies that the principal faces a 
disadvantage with respect to judging the agent‘s true knowledge and/or efforts in carrying out 
the delegated task. For example, patients typically cannot fully ascertain the physician’s 
knowledge, abilities, and skills. They may rely on the academic degrees the agents hold, their 
reputation or the like; however, only the agents know the true state of their knowledge, 
abilities, and skills. The situation is complicated by self-interested agents potentially 
deliberately hiding their true qualities (e.g., a lack of appropriate skills for conducting the task 
at hand) or even falsifying signals (e.g., faking their CV or the degrees they hold) in order to 
get a job and to earn the related rents. Therefore, when informational asymmetry is present 
already before the principal hires an agent this gives rise to the so-called “hidden 
characteristics” problem. It is one of the core problems in delegation under conflicting 
interests and information asymmetry between the parties studied by agency theory. 
Even if the principal is perfectly informed about the characteristics of the agent(s), she 
may nevertheless face an information disadvantage with respect to the actions taken by the 
agent(s). More precisely, the disadvantage (i.e., informational asymmetry) concerns which 
action (or effort level) the agent actually took, whether it was the right one given the 
circumstances, and exactly which circumstances pertained (Grossman and Hart, 1983; 
Holmström, 1979). For example, the sales of a salesperson on a local market are influenced 
by stochastic influences, such as changes to local demand, that may be hard or simply too 
costly to ascertain by the principal (the firm who employs the salesperson). Of course, agents 
are likely to hold superior knowledge concerning the true actions or effort they exert in 
carrying out the task. Agents may exploit this information asymmetry by engaging in actions 
not valued by the principal or withholding effort or other forms of “hidden action”. This is 
often captured by the notion that the agent experiences “disutility of labor,” which is 
somewhat misleading as it implies that agents are lazy. They may be, but the more general 
interpretation is that agents prefer dedicating effort to activities they choose themselves.  
The upshot of the above is that the principal may face informational disadvantages 
either ex ante (i.e., “adverse selection”, “hidden information”), that is, in the contracting stage 
of the relationship, or ex post (“moral hazard,” “hidden action”) when the agent may carry out 
the delegated task in a manner or with an intensity diverging from what would maximize the 
principal’s payoffs. Further complicating is the fact that both problems may appear within the 
same relationship. For example, when looking for legal advice from a lawyer, the client may 
neither know enough to fully judge alternative lawyers’ abilities, knowledge, and skill nor 
may s/he be able to observe and properly judge the efforts made by the lawyer chosen. Under 
conflicting interests and when the principal is either not knowledgeable of the task she wishes 
to delegate and/or cannot observe the agent’s characteristics and actions, the principal faces 
problems of hidden characteristics or hidden action (or both). Hence, both information 
asymmetry and conflict of interest are necessary ingredients for a “principal-agent problem” 
to exist. 
2. Core Insights and Predictions of the Agency Model  
2.1 The Linear Agency Model  
 The workhorse model of agency theory, the “linear model” (Holmström and Milgrom, 
1991; see also Holmström, 1979, for a seminal contribution that is also echoed in the 
following) studies a two-party setting: one principal and one agent. Both are assumed to be 
self-interested, behave rationally, and maximize their utility. Due to information asymmetry 
ex post, the principal is unable to contract over the agent’s actions (which the principal 
assumingly cannot observe), but only over the output z of the agent’s actions. (In agency 
theory, all observable variables are contractible). For convenience, most agency theorists 
think of the agent’s actions as his effort e, that is, alternative actions correspond to different 
effort levels (e.g., Holmström, 1979) and the terms effort and action are thus used 
interchangeable in much of the literature. The result z in turn is assumed to depend linearly on 
the sum of the agent’s choice of effort e and some stochastic influence from the environment 
θ. For simplicity, the basic model assumes this external influence to be standard-normally 
distributed with an expectation of zero. Both, the distribution and the expectation are known 
by both parties, whereas the true effort e exerted by the agent and the actual state of the 
environment θ are only known to the agent; the principal can only observe the result z caused 
by both e and θ. The principal is thus assumed to be unable to ascertain whether a good result 
z is due to the agent’s high effort level e or due to “luck” (θ); hence, she faces a problem of 
hidden action/moral hazard. 
The interaction between the principal and the agent starts with the principal contracting 
with the agent about a wage W, which is comprised of some proportion β of the result z 
generated by the agent (potentially plus some fixed salary component W0). The share of the 
result z that the principal agrees to pay the agent (i.e. the β) is referred to as “incentive 
intensity”. As the true effort e cannot be observed, the agent’s wage W must be based on the 
result z obtained (which is influenced by the stochastic environment). Therefore, any β larger 
than zero implies that the agent is exposed to risk with respect to his/her remuneration. And 
here comes another assumption of the (basic) agency model into play: The risk aversion rA of 
the agent. Whereas the principal is assumed to be risk neutral (she is able to diversify risk, 
e.g., by holding a market portfolio of relationships), the agent is assumed to be risk averse as 
his payoffs are linked to the particular relationship (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1983). Risk-
aversion implies that the agent will ask for a premium in order to accept a contract offered by 
the principal based on the risky result z. 
This risk premium reduces the surplus, but does not give the agent extra utility. Thus, the 
larger the risk-premium, the smaller the total value created in the relation (i.e., the sum of the 
monetary equivalents of the utilities of the principal and the agent). The size of the risk-
premium depends on both the degree of risk-aversion of the agent rA and the riskiness of the 
wage (i.e., the variance in the wage due to the environment’s impact (Var (W) = 2 Var ( )). 
Thus, β has to solve two tasks: providing incentives to the agent to work hard and insurance 
against risk (note: literature unfortunately also uses the term “uncertainty” to denote the 
stochastic nature of the agent’s payoffs, which we do not follow here as it clutters the 
differences between randomness and true uncertainty in the sense of Frank Knight, that is, 
outcomes for which no distribution and expected value are known). It is, therefore, usually 
impossible under information asymmetry to handle both tasks optimally (Holmström, 1979). 
Therefore, any solution is inefficient (“second-best”) as compared to a hypothetical first-best 
solution in which the principal would bear all the risk and the agent would be paid on his/her 
efforts only.  
In addition to the (risky) payoffs associated with the relation, agents are expected to 
consider their costs (Grossman and Hart, 1983). Agents are assumed to have exponentially 
growing disutility of engaging in effort (C(e)). Principals in turn need to take this into account 
when solving their own optimization problem concerning the optimal β. As Holmström and 
Milgrom (1991) show, this can be done neatly by starting out from the certainty equivalents 
of both parties. A certainty equivalent is the certain value that makes an individual indifferent 
in terms of utility between obtaining the “risk-free” certain value and a risky “lottery” value. 
For the agent the certainty equivalent corresponds to the wage minus the risk premium minus 
the costs (i.e., CEA= W0 +  e – ½  rA  
2
  Var() – C(e) ). Taking the first derivative of 
this term to e and then setting the expression to zero and solving for β yields the helpful term 
of   = C’(e), that is, the agent’s optimal choice of e is where marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost. The optimizing behavior of the agent implies that his efforts e are a function of 
. Based on this insight only a few mathematical optimization steps are now necessary to 
solve the principal’s problem, that is: to get from the task to maximize the total certainty 
equivalent for both parties (max CETotal = P(e()) – C(e()) – ½  rA  
2
  Var()) to the 
optimal incentive intensity (denoted as *) (for the details of the a mathematical derivation 
see e.g., Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, pp. 222n; and for the original formulation, Holmström & 
Milgrom, 1991).  
The resulting expression * = P’(e) / [1 + rA  Var() C’’(e)] suggest that the optimal 
 depends on four factors: (1) The more sensitive the payoff to the principal on changes in the 
agent’s efforts or actions (P’(e)), the larger should be *; (2) the stronger the agent’s risk 
aversion rA, the lower the *; (3) the larger the riskiness of the results obtained by the agent 
due to environmental influences Var(), the lower the incentive intensity; and (4) the stronger 
the agent’s discretion regarding the choice of activities (e/ = 1/C’’(e)), that is, the lower 
his/her costs of acting in a manner functional for maximizing the principal’s payoffs C’’(e), 
the larger the *.  
2.2 Core Insights 
The set of insights what determines β* has become known in literature under the label of 
the “incentive intensity principle”. It is one of the core contributions of agency theory to the 
understanding of how principals can set incentives and design monitoring schemes in order to 
minimize the welfare loss (“agency costs”) resulting from conflict of interest and information 
asymmetry ex post. In short, β* is determined by incentive elasticity of profits (e.g., there may 
be tasks where strengthening incentives does not lead to more effort being supplied); the risk 
tolerance of the agents (e.g., agents that are high in risk aversion will demand a high risk 
premium); the effort elasticity of incentives (e.g., some agents may have work/leisure 
tradeoffs such that they are not easily incentivized); and the measurability of outputs (if 
outputs are very costly to measure, it may be counterproductive to tie pay to outputs).  
A key application of the linear model concerns when to use additional information y in the 
incentive design, such as for example the sales performance of other sales reps when 
incentivizing a particular sales person or the performance of similar firms in the industry 
when judging top-management’s efforts and so on. The extended model demonstrates that if 
the additional information gathered is not “informative” about the focal agent’s true effort, 
that is: if the additional information y used has a covariance of zero with the state of the 
environment , then including the additional information in the wage contract with the agent 
is unreasonable. Including it under such conditions only adds noise, which makes drawing 
conclusions about the agent’s true effort level or actions even harder (Milgrom & Roberts, 
1992). Therefore, the “informativeness principle” calls for including additional available 
information only if it allows reducing noise. 
The “equal compensation principle” stems from yet another extension of the basic model. 
This extension renders the model more realistic by allowing the focal agent being responsible 
not only for a single or single-dimensional task, but for multiple tasks or multi-dimensional 
tasks, with performance on some tasks or dimensions easily measureable and others only 
difficult or prohibitively expensive to assess. Holmström and Milgrom (1991) show that under 
such conditions, agents will shift their effort to those tasks/dimensions that are measured (and 
rewarded) by the principal(s) at the detriment of other tasks (or other dimensions of the task) 
that are too expensive to assess. For example, the agent may focus on her/his results looking 
good in terms of the financial performance achieved, but neglect other non-financial and 
maybe only qualitative aspects, such as performance with respect to customer-satisfaction, 
environmental or social dimensions of a task and so on. The extended model thus suggests 
two consequences: (1) grouping easy-to-measure tasks together instead of spreading them 
over multiple individuals, and to provide a low β to those individuals engaging in the tasks 
with the hard or impossible to measure dimensions/tasks, and (2) choosing only a low β if the 
task dimensions cannot be separated organizationally on multiple individuals and agents thus 
have to carry out multi-dimensional tasks with some dimensions costly to measure but 
essential to the principal.  
Finally, the “monitoring-intensity principle” highlights the complementarities of 
incentive provision and monitoring in addressing hidden action problems. Whereas the basic 
model treats the variance with which efforts are measured as outside the principal’s control, it 
is in many cases more realistic to assume the principal to be able to improve measurement by 
spending resources on, for example, more detailed data collection, a lower span of control of 
supervisors allowing them to closer monitor individual employees, and so on. While all of 
these actions are costly to the principal, they improve the principal’s information about how 
the agent performs. By including the costs for measurement in the optimization problem, the 
extended model suggests that more resources should be spent on measurement when the 
incentive intensity is higher. Hence, high incentive intensity and careful performance 
measurement are complementary (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
Besides these exemplary extensions, agency theorists have developed a great number 
of other refinements of the model that relax certain assumptions and render the model more 
realistic. For example, scholars have refined the model to allow for multi-period settings, risk-
averse principals, risk-neutral agents, non-linear production functions, subjective versus 
objective performance measures, or to expand the model to comprise more than two parties – 
that is, multiple principals and/or agents (e.g., Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1994; Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992). 
The basic agency model (and many of its extensions) provides insights for handling 
both ex post as well as ex ante information asymmetry. For example, it suggests that 
principals offering agents a contract with a β > 0 are likely not only to reduce problems of 
hidden action, but can also already ex ante trigger that agents with lower abilities and skills 
prefer not to accept such a performance-contingent contract and to, for example, look for 
other employment opportunities where they are given a fixed salary. Thus, firms switching 
from paying their employees a flat wage can be expected to benefit from two effects: First, an 
increase in the effort level exerted by the employees already employed by the firm (“incentive 
effect”) and second, a beneficial change in the pool of new applicants for positions with the 
firm (i.e., the “sorting effect” of variable incentive schemes).  
Principals may also rely on increased information gathering already ex ante about 
potential agents in the contracting stage to reduce information asymmetry. Job interviews are 
one example of such information gathering or screening activities ex ante that aim at reducing 
the hidden characteristics problem. Agents themselves may take the initiative by signaling 
their true (“good”) characteristics to the principal(s), that is, reducing information asymmetry 
between them and the principal(s) through such instruments like, for example, providing 
warrantees for used cars that they wish to sell in the example of car dealers, or investing into 
acquiring academic degrees in case of agents seeking a job. 
3. Exemplary Applications and Contributions 
Conflict of interest and asymmetric information are widespread phenomena in 
cooperative activities among individuals (Holmström, 1979; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Ross, 1973). Thus, it is not surprising to see agency theory being applied to the study of a 
wide range of relationships within labor market (i.e., labor market economics) and business 
contexts (i.e., personnel economics), as well as in sociology or political science research. 
Discussing the many applications of agency theory is beyond the scope of this chapter; in fact, 
merely scratching the surface of this huge body of literature is a daunting challenge. 
By looking at relationships between two or more cooperating individuals in terms of a 
“nexus” of explicit or implicit contracts (e.g., Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), agency theorists were among the first scholars who opened up the “black 
box” of firms and organizations, and contributed the explaining rationales and workings of 
other kinds of economic organization (i.e., various kinds of non-firm contracting 
arrangements). An early influential stream (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) conceptualized firms 
as an efficient responses to agency problems caused by “team production” in which individual 
productivity is costly to observe, but the team’s output is not. In this situation it makes sense 
to appoint a monitor who holds residual income rights to the team’s output, because this 
means that he will undertake an efficient level of monitoring. Thus, the monitor is also the 
owner of the firm and holds right to discipline team members—a rudimentary theory of why 
there are firms in a market economy (see Holmström, 1982, for important refinements and 
extensions).  
These contributions represent marked scientific progress over the previously dominant 
perspective of firms as production functions with their own preferences and decision making 
presumably corresponding to a single individual. It has profoundly changed how economics 
and business research think about firms and organizations in general in fields such as 
corporate governance, human resource management (in particular: remuneration), strategy 
implementation, performance measurement, organizational control, accounting as well as 
phenomena affecting intersections of multiple of these fields.  
 Agency theory (and derivations thereof) sees application to a growing number of 
research fields within political science and sociology (see Kiser, 1999, for a detailed review). 
Scholars in political science have applied (often more or less adapted versions) of agency 
theory to a wide array of topics, with particular emphasis on studying legislatures and policy 
implementation. In an early application, Rose-Ackerman (1975), for example, uses agency 
theory to study corrupt dealings in the government contracting process. Others have focused 
on how “red tape” can serve a monitoring function to achieve that policy decisions by 
unelected bureaucratic officials are responsive to the preferences of citizens. Adams (1996) in 
turn provides an example of the theory’s use within sociology to study the relationship 
between patrimonial states and colonial trading companies in the Netherlands and England.  
4. Criticisms and Limitations 
 Agency theory has attracted considerable criticism from various authors and scholarly 
fields. In particular, numerous authors have criticized the assumptions underlying the standard 
agency model as too restrictive, that is: as not being generalizable to the overwhelming part of 
humans, but as rather being particular to just a subset of individuals.  
Given and state independent utility/risk functions. 
Empirical and experimental research suggests that the von Neumann and Morgenstern 
utility functions underlying agency theory are likely not to be as generally applicable, as was 
originally hoped. For example, Prospect Theory advanced by Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky in response to empirical evidence questioning the von Neumann and Morgenstern 
utility theory suggests that individuals will consider their current wealth when evaluating how 
to act, implying that the same individual may sometimes be risk averse, risk neutral or even 
risk seeking depending on the state of his/her personal wealth. So far, these insights have not 
yet been incorporated into agency theory. 
Complete contracting  
Agency theory assumes complete rationality of the parties involved, implying that the 
contracts between the principal(s) and the agent(s) will contain all available information and 
that the terms stipulated in the contract will consider all possible future situations (so called 
“complete contracts”). Hence, while principal(s) and agent(s) are assumed to differ in terms of 
the information about the characteristics of the agent(s) or their actions, the theory assumes 
that each of the parties makes full use of the information available to it in designing the 
contract and in deciding on how to act, respectively. Agency theory thus—as opposed to 
transaction cost economics—abstracts from potential costs for incorporating information into 
the contracts as well as from the possibility that contracts may be incomplete simply due to 
insufficient knowledge about all potential future situations or actions possible. Whereas Ross 
(1973: 135) submits that under the assumption of complete contracts “the problem is 
considerably simplified but much of the interest does remain”, agency theory’s underlying 
assumption thus nevertheless hampers its usefulness for the study of a number of highly 
important real-world phenomena. Entrepreneurship, for example, while undoubtedly a core 
economic phenomenon, is hard to study when allowing only for risk – that is, probabilistically 
known future states that hence can be included in a complete contract, but not uncertainty in 
the sense of Frank Knight, which defies standard probabilistic accounts, but which is part of 
the very nature of entrepreneurial activities. Hence, such fundamental questions of what the 
principal should want the agent to do and how the principal actually became the principal in 
the first place have been rather sidelined in agency theory.  
Self-interest / Opportunism 
 Some authors have pointed out that agency theory may paint a too dark picture of 
human nature by assuming that individuals behave opportunistically. Perrow (1986) even 
went as far as claiming that agency theory is “not only wrong but dangerous” (p. 11)—a 
theme echoed by a host of writers after the onset of the current financial crisis claiming that 
agency theory reflects a misguided libertarian ideology and would prompt the adoption of an 
overly cynical view of human nature. They warn that when this view is generalized, for 
example, through the teachings of economists in universities and business schools, there is a 
risk that important pro-social behaviors are crowded out or that a self-fulfilling prophecy 
might result from assuming individuals to be opportunistic.  Moreover, some scholars have 
pointed out that the theory does not devote sufficient attention to the potential consequences 
of the principal’s opportunism, in the sense that he may try to cheat on the agent in the 
performance evaluation or reward. However, given that the theory assumes complete 
contracting, i.e. that the agent might appeal to a third party – e.g., a court – for enforcement of 
the contract, this criticism seems rather misguided. 
Intrinsic motivation 
The phenomenon of a “crowding-out” of task-autonomous motivation (often called 
“intrinsic motivation”) largely associated with the pioneering works by Edward L. Deci and 
Richard M. Ryan has attracted massive interest among scholars in psychology, education 
research, and lately also in economics and management research. Whereas it seems rather 
well established within education research that administrating incentives that are perceived as 
controlling undermines the pre-existing task-related autonomous motivation of the agent to 
engage in the task—for example, due to enjoyment of carrying-out the task or due to fully 
internalized norms and values of the agent—the jury is still out when it comes to the 
phenomenon’s existence and magnitude in common business settings. Several studies in 
economics (e.g., Lazear, 2000) reported increases in employee’s engagement in routine or 
mundane activities – such as for example, the installation of auto glass – when providing 
performance-contingent incentives for these activities. However, the existing evidence on 
motivation crowding suggests that it is likely that the phenomenon pertains to non-mundane 
tasks in business situations. Existing agency models thus are likely to require adaptation to 
take the interaction of incentives (and monitoring) with task-autonomous motivation of the 
agent(s) for non-mundane tasks explicitly into account. This might lead to more nuanced 
versions of the incentive and monitoring intensity principles.   
Dominance of linear models with small number of players in agency models 
 The common linear models used in much of agency theory provide great tractability. 
Yet, linear contracts may not be optimal contracts and the generality of the findings may thus 
be limited. Similarly, limiting the models to only a small number of principals and/or agents is 
necessary to keep model complexity to a manageable level. However, real-world social 
behavior, in particular in groups of “agents”, is likely to be much more complex than 
suggested by models focusing only on a small number of players.  
Practical usefulness of agency insights  
A number of scholars have questioned the practical applicability of (some of) the 
insights obtained from agency models. First, in practice managers and HR professionals often 
lack the information assumed available in principal-agent models, such as, for example, the 
marginal effect on the principal’s payoffs of an increase in the agent’s effort level by one unit, 
risk tolerance, or the agent’s responsiveness to incentives. Measurement of these variables in 
practice is still a thorny issue, reducing many of the highly interesting theoretical insights 
generated by agency theory to mere rough guidelines from a practitioner’s perspective. 
Second, contrary to what agency theory typically assumes, employment contracts and many 
other contracts are subject to external restrictions beyond the principal’s control, such as labor 
laws, generating outcomes different from those analyzed in the theory. Third, contracting may 
in practice not necessarily correspond to the situation assumed in agency theory with the 
principal proposing contracts on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Rather, some bargaining between 
the principal(s) and the agent(s) will take place. Thus, it may not be wise for principals in 
practice to propose to their agent(s) the optimal contract right-away, but rather to propose one 
that will—considering the bargaining to take place—lead to the optimal contract (or one that 
is close enough). As agency theory does not provide guidance here, insights from bargaining 
theory may be necessary and valuable complements to practitioners. 
In defense of agency theory  
Whereas agency theory’s assumptions have attracted considerable criticism from many 
sides, they do possess a particular strength: their explicit nature. This allows systematically 
relaxing them, that is, adapting them to assumptions deemed more “realistic”. Thus, while the 
assumptions underlying the basic agency model are likely not representative of humans in 
general, the theory provides for a framework that allows modeling a large number of more or 
less diverging assumptions—and testing the need for, benefits of and shortcomings of 
alternative governance modes as well as incentive and monitoring schemes under these 
assumptions. The explicit nature of agency theory’s assumptions thus is an asset facilitating 
cumulative knowledge growth and continuous refinement of the recommendations developed 
by scholars.  
 The use of the theory itself outside economics and business administration has 
triggered criticism, sometimes sparked outcries of “economics imperialism”. Yet, it is 
important to note that agency theory while first gaining popularity in economics, is 
conceptually closely linked in many ways to earlier work in sociology, such as Max Weber’s 
works. Moreover, agency theory has not only strongly influenced research in political science 
and sociology, but has seen itself being adapted and transformed to better fit their different 
disciplinary contexts (Kiser, 1999). This holds particularly true for the variant of agency 
theory typically employed in sociology, which can be seen as an amalgam of Weber’ian 
sociological insights and the economic agency model, which implies a much broader 
conception of both the micro and the macro-levels (see Kiser, 1999, for an excellent 
discussion of this topic). 
 Agency theory’s popularity among scholars and, in particular, its seemingly simple 
“lesson” that agency problems can be largely cured by relying more on performance-
contingent incentives instead of fixed salaries, have contributed significantly to the marked 
trend towards merit-based payment and promotion schemes in recent years. The “lesson” that 
one needs to “pay for performance” in order to obtain superior results made it into MBA 
curricula, consultants’ recommendations, and ultimately into management practice at most 
larger firms in North America and Europe. Hence, agency theory can be seen to have had a 
tremendous practical impact—which, as mentioned, has spawned criticism of the theory. 
However, a closer look at the scientific debate about agency problems and the ways to address 
them suggests that the incentive practices used are at best a bad copy of what agency theory 
recommends doing. Thus, already the basic linear model shows that strong variable incentives 
(a high β) are by no means recommendable under all circumstances. And the extensions of the 
basic model introduced into the literature over the course of the past 30 years further 
strengthen the conditionality under which “high-powered” incentives are optimal – and when 
they promise to fail (e.g., Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 1994; Holmström and Milgrom, 
1991). Surprisingly, however, these insights seem to have had little impact on compensation 
practices in banking and the public debate about them. Overall, thus agency theory while 
having inspired practice, has unfortunately not seen a more wide-spread application of one of 
its most important insights: the conditions necessary for using high-powered incentives.  
5. Conclusion and Outlook 
Agency theory studies the problems and solutions linked to delegation of tasks under 
information asymmetry and conflicting interests between two or more parties. It assumes 
rationality and opportunism of the parties involved and deals with both, problems of ex ante 
(“hidden characteristics”) as well as ex post information asymmetry (“hidden action”). 
Agency models provide a number of very important recommendations for designing 
contracts, such as the incentive intensity and the monitoring intensity principles. The theory’s 
broad applicability (Holmström, 1979; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973) allows agency 
theory to enjoy tremendous scientific impact, both within economics and management 
research as well as beyond. At the same time it also has attracted considerable criticism. Most 
of this criticism focuses on the assumptions underlying agency theory, and in particular those 
underlying simple models. These assumptions are often very restrictive to foster tractability of 
the problems in mathematical terms. Some of the polemical criticisms of it are however 
misguided. Recent years have witnessed considerable effort in economics and management 
research addressing some of the theory’s major limitations and some of the criticisms do not 
apply to the “derivatives” of economic agency theory found in sociology and political science 
(Kiser, 1999).  
 
Bibliography: 
Adams J 1996 Principals and Agents, Colonialists and Company Men: The Decay of Colonial 
Control in the Dutch East Indies. American Sociological Review 61(February): 12-28. 
Alchian A, Demsetz H 1972 Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization. 
American Economic Review 62(December): 777-95. 
Baker G, Gibbons G R, Murphy K J 1994. Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal 
Incentive Contracts. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 1125-1156. 
Grossman S J, Hart O D 1983 An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem. Econometrica 
51(1): 7-45. 
Holmström B 1979 Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics 10(1): 74-
91.  
Holmström B 1982 Moral hazard in teams. The Bell Journal of Economics 13(2): 324-340.  
Holmström B, Milgrom R 1991 Multitask principal agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset 
ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 7: 24-52.  
Jensen M, Meckling W 1976 Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Capital Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (October): 305-60. 
Jensen M C, Smith C W 1985 Stockholder, Manager, and Creditor Interests: Applications of 
Agency Theory. In: E I Altman and M G Subrahmanyam (eds.), Recent Advances in 
Corporate Finance. Homewood, IL: Dow-Jones Irwin: 93-131. 
Lazear E P 2000 Performance Pay and Productivity. American Economic Review 90: 1346-
1361. 
Laffont J-J, Martimort D 2001 Theory of Incentives I: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Milgrom P, Roberts J 1992 Economics, Organization & Management. Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall.  
Perrow C 1986 Economic Theories of Organization. Theory & Society 15: 11-45. 
Rose-Ackerman S 1975 The Economics of Corruption. Journal of Public Economics 4(2): 
187-203. 
Ross S A 1973 The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal’s Problem. American 
Economic Review 63(2): 134-39. 
 
Cross-References:  
Within the sub-encylopedia “Management, Organizations, Business, Marketing and Finance”: 
Microfoundational Approaches; Rational Choice and Organization Theory; Stockholders' 
Ownership and Control; Hierarchies and Markets; Boundaries and New Organization 
Forms; People in Organizations; Corporate Governance; Management: General 
Within the sub-encyclopedia “Motivational Psychology”: 
Intrinsic Motivation, Psychology of; Personality and Risk Taking; Psychology and Economics 
Within the sub-encyclopedia “Philosophy”: 
Rational Choice Explanation (Philosophical Aspects);  
Within the sub-encyclopedia “Sociology”: 
Rational Choice Theory in Sociology; Rational Choice Theory;  
Within the sub-encyclopedia “Applied, Industrial and Organizational Psychology”: 
Pay and Compensation, Psychology of; Personnel Selection, Psychology of; Work motivation; 
Performance evaluation;  
 
SMG – Working Papers 
www.cbs.dk/smg 
 
2003 
2003-1: Nicolai J. Foss, Kenneth Husted, Snejina Michailova, and Torben Pedersen: 
Governing Knowledge Processes: Theoretical Foundations and Research 
Opportunities. 
2003-2: Yves Doz, Nicolai J. Foss, Stefanie Lenway, Marjorie Lyles, Silvia Massini, 
Thomas P. Murtha and Torben Pedersen: Future Frontiers in International 
Management Research: Innovation, Knowledge Creation, and Change in 
Multinational Companies. 
2003-3: Snejina Michailova and Kate Hutchings: The Impact of In-Groups and Out-
Groups on Knowledge Sharing in Russia and China CKG Working Paper. 
2003-4: Nicolai J. Foss and Torben Pedersen: The MNC as a Knowledge Structure: The 
Roles of Knowledge Sources and Organizational Instruments in MNC Knowledge 
Management CKG Working Paper. 
2003-5: Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss and Xosé H. Vázquez-Vicente: “Tying the Manager’s 
Hands”: How Firms Can Make Credible Commitments That Make Opportunistic 
Managerial Intervention Less Likely CKG Working Paper. 
2003-6: Marjorie Lyles, Torben Pedersen and Bent Petersen: Knowledge Gaps: The Case 
of Knowledge about Foreign Entry. 
2003-7: Kirsten Foss and Nicolai J. Foss: The Limits to Designed Orders: Authority under 
“Distributed Knowledge” CKG Working Paper. 
2003-8: Jens Gammelgaard and Torben Pedersen: Internal versus External Knowledge 
Sourcing of Subsidiaries - An Organizational Trade-Off. 
2003-9: Kate Hutchings and Snejina Michailova: Facilitating Knowledge Sharing in 
Russian and Chinese Subsidiaries: The Importance of Groups and Personal 
Networks Accepted for publication in Journal of Knowledge Management. 
2003-10: Volker Mahnke, Torben Pedersen and Markus Verzin: The Impact of Knowledge 
Management on MNC Subsidiary Performance: the Role of Absorptive Capacity 
CKG Working Paper. 
2003-11: Tomas Hellström and Kenneth Husted: Mapping Knowledge and Intellectual 
Capital in Academic Environments: A Focus Group Study Accepted for 
publication in Journal of Intellectual Capital  CKG Working Paper.  
2003-12: Nicolai J Foss: Cognition and Motivation in the Theory of the Firm: Interaction or 
“Never the Twain Shall Meet”? Accepted for publication in Journal des Economistes 
et des Etudes Humaines CKG Working Paper.  
2003-13: Dana Minbaeva and Snejina Michailova: Knowledge Transfer and Expatriation 
Practices in MNCs: The Role of Disseminative Capacity.  
2003-14: Christian Vintergaard and Kenneth Husted: Enhancing Selective Capacity 
Through Venture Bases.  
2004 
2004-1: Nicolai J. Foss: Knowledge and Organization in the Theory of the Multinational 
Corporation: Some Foundational Issues 
2004-2: Dana B. Minbaeva: HRM Practices and MNC Knowledge Transfer  
2004-3: Bo Bernhard Nielsen and Snejina Michailova: Toward a Phase-Model of Global 
Knowledge Management Systems in Multinational Corporations 
2004-4: Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J Foss: The Next Step in the Evolution of the RBV: 
Integration with Transaction Cost Economics 
2004-5: Teppo Felin & Nicolai J. Foss: Methodological Individualism and the 
Organizational Capabilities Approach 
2004-6: Jens Gammelgaard, Kenneth Husted, Snejina Michailova: Knowledge-sharing 
Behavior and Post-acquisition Integration Failure 
2004-7: Jens Gammelgaard: Multinational Exploration of Acquired R&D Activities 
2004-8: Christoph Dörrenbächer & Jens Gammelgaard: Subsidiary Upgrading? Strategic 
Inertia in the Development of German-owned Subsidiaries in Hungary 
2004-9: Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Resources and Transaction Costs: How the 
Economics of Property Rights Furthers the Resource-based View 
2004-10: Jens Gammelgaard & Thomas Ritter: The Knowledge Retrieval Matrix: 
Codification and Personification as Separate Strategies 
2004-11: Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Entrepreneurship and the Economic Theory of 
the Firm: Any Gains from Trade? 
2004-12: Akshey Gupta & Snejina Michailova: Knowledge Sharing in Knowledge-Intensive 
Firms: Opportunities and Limitations of Knowledge Codification 
2004-13: Snejina Michailova & Kate Hutchings: Knowledge Sharing and National Culture: 
A Comparison Between China and Russia 
 
2005 
2005-1: Keld Laursen & Ammon Salter: My Precious - The Role of Appropriability 
Strategies in Shaping Innovative Performance 
2005-2: Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: The Theory of the Firm and Its Critics: A 
Stocktaking and Assessment 
2005-3: Lars Bo Jeppesen & Lars Frederiksen: Why Firm-Established User Communities 
Work for Innovation: The Personal Attributes of Innovative Users in the Case of 
Computer-Controlled Music  
2005-4: Dana B. Minbaeva: Negative Impact of HRM Complementarity on Knowledge 
Transfer in MNCs 
2005-5: Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss, Peter G. Klein & Sandra K. Klein: Austrian Capital 
Theory and the Link Between Entrepreneurship and the Theory of the Firm 
2005-1: Nicolai J. Foss: The Knowledge Governance Approach 
2005-2: Torben J. Andersen: Capital Structure, Environmental Dynamism, Innovation 
Strategy, and Strategic Risk Management 
2005-3: Torben J. Andersen: A Strategic Risk Management Framework for Multinational 
Enterprise 
2005-4: Peter Holdt Christensen: Facilitating Knowledge Sharing: A Conceptual 
Framework 
2005-5 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Hands Off! How Organizational Design Can Make 
Delegation Credible 
2005-6 Marjorie A. Lyles, Torben Pedersen & Bent Petersen: Closing the Knowledge Gap 
in Foreign Markets - A Learning Perspective 
2005-7 Christian Geisler Asmussen, Torben Pedersen & Bent Petersen: How do we 
Capture “Global Specialization” when Measuring Firms’ Degree of 
internationalization? 
2005-8 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Simon on Problem-Solving: Implications for New 
Organizational Forms 
2005-9 Birgitte Grøgaard, Carmine Gioia & Gabriel R.G. Benito: An Empirical 
Investigation of the Role of Industry Factors in the Internationalization Patterns of 
Firms 
2005-10 Torben J. Andersen: The Performance and Risk Management Implications of 
Multinationality: An Industry Perspective 
2005-11 Nicolai J. Foss: The Scientific Progress in Strategic Management: The case of the 
Resource-based view 
2005-12 Koen H. Heimeriks: Alliance Capability as a Mediator Between Experience and 
Alliance Performance: An Empirical Investigation Into the Alliance Capability 
Development Process 
2005-13 Koen H. Heimeriks, Geert Duysters & Wim Vanhaverbeke: Developing Alliance 
Capabilities: An Empirical Study 
2005-14 JC Spender: Management, Rational or Creative? A Knowledge-Based Discussion 
 
2006 
2006-1: Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: The Emergence of the Modern Theory of the Firm 
2006-2: Teppo Felin & Nicolai J. Foss: Individuals and Organizations: Thoughts on a 
Micro-Foundations Project for Strategic Management and Organizational 
Analysis 
2006-3: Volker Mahnke, Torben Pedersen & Markus Venzin: Does Knowledge Sharing 
Pay? An MNC Subsidiary Perspective on Knowledge Outflows 
2006-4: Torben Pedersen: Determining Factors of Subsidiary Development 
 
2006-5 Ibuki Ishikawa: The Source of Competitive Advantage and Entrepreneurial 
Judgment in the RBV: Insights from the Austrian School Perspective 
2006-6 Nicolai J. Foss & Ibuki Ishikawa: Towards a Dynamic Resource-Based View: 
Insights from Austrian Capital and Entrepreneurship Theory 
2006-7 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss:  Entrepreneurship, Transaction Costs, and 
Resource Attributes  
2006-8 Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Original and Derived Judgement: 
An Entrepreneurial Theory of Economic Organization 
2006-9 Mia Reinholt: No More Polarization, Please! Towards a More Nuanced 
Perspective on Motivation in Organizations 
2006-10 Angelika Lindstrand, Sara Melen & Emilia Rovira: Turning social capital into 
business? A study of Swedish biotech firms’ international expansion 
2006-11 Christian Geisler Asmussen, Torben Pedersen & Charles Dhanaraj: Evolution of 
Subsidiary Competences: Extending the Diamond Network Model 
2006-12 John Holt, William R. Purcell, Sidney J. Gray & Torben Pedersen: Decision Factors 
Influencing MNEs Regional Headquarters Location Selection Strategies 
2006-13 Peter Maskell, Torben Pedersen, Bent Petersen & Jens Dick-Nielsen: Learning 
Paths to Offshore Outsourcing - From Cost Reduction to Knowledge Seeking 
2006-14 Christian Geisler Asmussen: Local, Regional or Global? Quantifying MNC 
Geographic Scope 
2006-15 Christian Bjørnskov & Nicolai J. Foss: Economic Freedom and Entrepreneurial 
Activity: Some Cross-Country Evidence 
2006-16 Nicolai J. Foss & Giampaolo Garzarelli: Institutions as Knowledge Capital: 
Ludwig M. Lachmann’s Interpretative Institutionalism 
2006-17 Koen H. Heimriks & Jeffrey J. Reuer: How to Build Alliance Capabilities 
2006-18 Nicolai J. Foss, Peter G. Klein, Yasemin Y. Kor & Joseph T. Mahoney: 
Entrepreneurship, Subjectivism, and the Resource – Based View: Towards a New 
Synthesis 
2006-19 Steven Globerman & Bo B. Nielsen: Equity Versus Non-Equity International 
Strategic Alliances: The Role of Host Country Governance 
 
2007 
2007-1 Peter Abell, Teppo Felin & Nicolai J. Foss: Building Micro-Foundations for the 
Routines, Capabilities, and Performance Links  
2007-2 Michael W. Hansen, Torben Pedersen & Bent Petersen: MNC Strategies and 
Linkage Effects in Developing Countries 
2007-3 Niron Hashai, Christian G. Asmussen, Gabriel R.G. Benito & Bent Petersen: 
Predicting the Diversity of Foreign Entry Modes 
2007-4 Peter D. Ørberg Jensen & Torben Pedersen: Whether and What to Offshore? 
2007-5 Ram Mudambi & Torben Pedersen: Agency Theory and Resource Dependency 
Theory: Complementary Explanations for Subsidiary Power in Multinational 
Corporations 
2007-6 Nicolai J. Foss: Strategic Belief Management 
2007-7 Nicolai J. Foss: Theory of Science Perspectives on Strategic Management Research: 
Debates and a Novel View 
2007-8 Dana B. Minbaeva: HRM Practices and Knowledge Transfer in MNCs 
2007-9 Nicolai J. Foss: Knowledge Governance in a Dynamic Global Context: The Center 
for Strategic Management and Globalization at the Copenhagen Business School 
2007-10 Paola Gritti & Nicolai J. Foss: Customer Satisfaction and Competencies: An 
Econometric Study of an Italian Bank 
2007-11 Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Organizational Governance 
2007-12 Torben Juul Andersen & Bo Bernhard Nielsen: The Effective Ambidextrous 
Organization: A Model of Integrative Strategy Making Processes. 
 
2008 
2008-1 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss:  Managerial Authority When Knowledge is 
Distributed: A Knowledge Governance Perspective 
2008-2 Nicolai J. Foss: Human Capital and Transaction Cost Economics. 
2008-3 Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Entrepreneurship and Heterogeneous Capital. 
2008-4 Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: The Need for an Entrepreneurial Theory of the 
Firm. 
2008-5 Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Entrepreneurship: From Opportunity Discovery 
to Judgment. 
2008-6 Mie Harder: How do Rewards and Management Styles Influence the Motivation 
to Share Knowledge? 
2008-7 Bent Petersen, Lawrence S. Welch & Gabriel R.G. Benito: Managing the 
Internalisation Process – A Theoretical Perspective.  
2008-8 Torben Juul Andersen: Multinational Performance and Risk Management Effects: 
Capital Structure Contingencies. 
2008-9 Bo Bernard Nielsen: Strategic Fit and the Role of Contractual and Procedural 
Governance in Alliances: A Dynamic Perspective. 
2008-10 Line Gry Knudsen & Bo Bernhard Nielsen: Collaborative Capability in R&D 
Alliances: Exploring the Link between Organizational and Individual level 
Factors. 
2008-11 Torben Juul Andersen & Mahesh P. Joshi: Strategic Orientations of 
Internationalizing Firms: A Comparative Analysis of Firms Operating in 
Technology Intensive and Common Goods Industries. 
2008-12 Dana Minbaeva: HRM Practices Affecting Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivation of 
Knowledge Receivers and their Effect on Intra-MNC Knowledge Transfer. 
2008-13 Steen E. Navrbjerg & Dana Minbaeva: HRM and IR in Multinational 
Corporations: Uneasy Bedfellows? 
2008-14 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Hayekian Knowledge Problems in Organizational 
Theory. 
2008-15 Torben Juul Andersen: Multinational Performance Relationships and Industry 
Context. 
2008-16 Larissa Rabbiosi: The Impact of Subsidiary Autonomy on MNE Knowledge 
Transfer: Resolving the Debate. 
2008-17 Line Gry Knudsen & Bo Bernhard Nielsen: Organizational and Individual Level 
Antecedents of Procedural Governance in Knowledge Sharing Alliances. 
2008-18 Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss: Understanding Opportunity Discovery and 
Sustainable Advantage: The Role of Transaction Costs and Property Rights. 
2008-19 
 
2008-20 
Teppo Felin & Nicolai J. Foss: Social Reality, The Boundaries of Self-fulfilling 
Prophecy, and Economics. 
Yves Dos, Nicolai J. Foss & José Santos: A Knowledge System Approach to the 
Multinational Company: Conceptual Grounding and Implications for Research 
2008-21 Sabina Nielsen & Bo Bernhard Nielsen: Why do Firms Employ foreigners on Their 
Top Management Teams? A Multi-Level Exploration of Individual and Firm 
Level Antecedents 
2008-22 Nicolai J. Foss: Review of Anders Christian Hansen’s “Uden for hovedstrømmen 
– Alternative strømninger i økonomisk teori” 
2008-23 Nicolai J. Foss: Knowledge, Economic Organization, and Property Rights 
2008-24 Sjoerd Beugelsdijk, Torben Pedersen & Bent Petersen: Is There a Trend Towards 
Global Value Chain Specialization? – An Examination of Cross Border Sales of US 
Foreign Affiliates 
2008-25 Vikas Kumar, Torben Pedersen & Alessandro Zattoni: The performance of 
business group firms during institutional transition: A longtitudinal study of 
Indian firms 
2008-26 Sabina Nielsen & Bo B. Nielsen: The effects of TMT and Board Nationality 
Diversity and Compensation on Firm Performance 
2008-27 Bo B. Nielsen & Sabina Nielsen: International Diversification Strategy and Firm 
Performance: A Multi-Level Analysis of Firm and Home Country Effects 
 
2009 
2009-1 Nicolai J. Foss: Alternative Research Strategies in the Knowledge Movement: From 
Macro Bias to Micro-Foundations and Multi-Level Explanation 
2009-2 Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Entrepreneurial Alertness and Opportunity 
Discovery: Origins, Attributes, Critique 
2009-3 Nicolai J. Foss & Dana B. Minbaeva: Governing Knowledge: The Strategic Human 
Resource Management Dimension 
2009-4 Nils Stieglitz & Nicolai J. Foss: Opportunities and New Business Models: 
Transaction Cost and Property Rights Perspectives on Entrepreneurships 
2009-5 Torben Pedersen: Vestas Wind Systems A/S: Exploiting Global R&D Synergies 
2009-6 
 
Rajshree Agarwal, Jay B. Barney, Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Heterogeneous 
Resources and the Financial Crisis: Implications of Strategic Management Theory 
2009-7 Jasper J. Hotho: A Measure of Comparative Institutional Distance 
2009-8 Bo B. Nielsen & Sabina Nielsen: The Impact of Top Management Team Nationality 
Diversity and International Experience on Foreign Entry Mode   
2009-9 Teppo Felin & Nicolai Juul Foss: Experience and Repetition as Antecedents of 
Organizational Routines and Capabilities: A Critique of Behaviorist and Empiricist 
Approaches 
2009-10 Henk W. Volberda, Nicolai J. Foss & Marjorie E. Lyles: Absorbing the Concept of 
Absorptive Capacity: How To Realize Its Potential in the Organization Field 
2009-11 
 
2009-12   
Jan Stentoft Arlbjørn, Brian Vejrum Wæhrens, John Johansen & Torben Pedersen: 
Produktion i Danmark eller offshoring/outsourcing: Ledelsesmæssige 
udfordringer 
 
 
Torben Pedersen: The 30 Largest Firms in Denmark 
  
2010 
 
2010-1 Dana B. Minbaeva, Kristiina Mäkelä & Larissa Rabbiosi: Explaining Intra-
organizational Knowledge Transfer at the Individual Level 
 
2010-2     Dana B.Minbaeva & Torben Pedersen: Governing Individual Knowledge Sharing 
Behavior 
2010-3 Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Alertness, Judgment, and the Antecedents of 
Entrepreneurship  
2010-4 Nicolai J.Foss & Joseph T.Mahoney: Exploring Knowledge Governance 
2010-5 Jasper J. Hotho, Florian Becker-Ritterspach & Ayse Saka-Helmhout: Enriching 
Absorptive Capacity Through Social Interaction 
 
2010-6 Nicolai J. Foss & Bo B. Nielsen: Researching Collaborative Advantage: Some 
Conceptual and Multi-level Issues 
 
2010-7 Nicolai J. Foss & Nils Stieglitz: Modern Resource-Based Theory(ies) 
2010-8 Christian Bjørnskov & Nicolai J. Foss: Do Economic Freedom and 
Entrepreneurship Impact Total Factor Productivity?  
 
2010-9 Gabriel R.G. Benito, Bent Petersen & Lawrence S. Welch: Mode Combinations and 
International Operations: Theoretical Issues and an Empirical Investigation 
 
2011 
 
2011-1 Peter D. Ørberg Jensen & Bent Petersen: Human Asset Internalization and Global 
Sourcing of Services – A Strategic Management Analysis on Activity‐level 
 
2011-2 Mie Harder: Management Innovation Capabilities:  A Typology and Propositions 
for Management Innovation Research 
 
2011-3 Mie Harder: Internal Antecedents of Management Innovation: The effect of 
diagnostic capability and implementation capability 
 
2011-4 Mie Harder: Explaining Management Innovation Pervasiveness: The Role of 
Internal Antecedents 
2011-5 Mie Harder: Internal Determinants of Product Innovation and Management 
Innovation: The Effect of Diagnostic Capability and Implementation Capability 
2011-6 Nicolai J. Foss, Peter G. Klein & Per L. Bylund: Entrepreneurship and the 
Economics of the Firm 
2011-7  Nicolai J. Foss & Jacob Lyngsie: The Emerging Strategic Entrepreneurship Field: 
Origins, Key Tenets and Research Gaps 
2011-8 
 
Nicolai J. Foss: Entrepreneurship in the Context of the Resource-based View of the 
Firm 
 
2011-9 Bent Petersen, Gabriel R.G. Benito, Olesya Dovgan & Lawrence Welch: Offshore 
outsourcing: A dynamic, operation mode perspective 
2011-10 Bent Petersen, Gabriel R. G. Benito & Lawrence Welch: Dynamics of Foreign 
Operation Modes and their Combinations: Insights for International Strategic 
Management 
2011-11 Nicolai J. Foss: Teams, Team Motivation, and the Theory of the Firm 
2011-12 Nicolai J. Foss: Knowledge Governance: Meaning, Nature, Origins, and Implications 
2011-13 Nicolai J. Foss, Kirsten Foss & Phillip C. Nell: MNC Organizational Form and 
Subsidiary Motivation Problems: Controlling Intervention Hazards in the Network MNC 
2011-14 Kåre Moberg: Evaluating Content Dimensions in Entrepreneurship Education 
 
 
2012 
 
2012-1 Nicolai J. Foss, Nicholas Argyres, Teppo Felin & Todd Zenger: The Organizational 
Economics of Organizational Capability and Heterogeneity: A Research Agenda 
2012-2 
 
Torben J. Andersen, Carina Antonia Hallin & Sigbjørn Tveterås: A Prediction 
Contest: The Sensing of Frontline Employees Against Executive Expectations 
2012-3 
 
Peter G. Klein, Jay B. Barney & Nicolai J. Foss: Strategic Entrepreneurship 
2012-4 
 
Kåre Moberg: The Impact of Entrepreneurship Education and Project-based 
Education on Students’ Personal Development and Entrepreneurial Intentions at 
the Lower Levels of the Educational System: Too Much of Two Good Things? 
2012-5 
 
Keld Laursen & Nicolai J. Foss: Human Resource Management Practices and 
Innovation 
2012-6 
 
 
2013-1 
 
Kåre Moberg: An Entrepreneurial Self-Efficacy Scale with a Neutral Wording 
 
 
2013 
 
 
Nicolai J. Foss, Diego Stea: The Principal’s Theory of Mind: The Role of 
Mentalizing for Reward Design and Management in Principal-Agent Relations  
2013-2 
 
2013-3 
 
2013-4 
 
 
 
 
 
2013-5 
 
Dana Minbaeva, Chansoo Park & Ilan Vertinsky: The Influence of Foreign 
Partners’ Disseminative Capacities on Knowledge Transfers to International Joint 
Ventures 
 
 
Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein: Hayek and Organizational Studies 
 
Kåre Moberg, Lene Vestergaard, Casper Jørgensen, Elisabeth Markussen & Sose 
Hakverdyan: How to Assess the Development of Entrepreneurship Education at 
University Level – the Case of Denmark 
 
Nicolai J. Foss & Siegwart Lindenberg: Micro-Foundations For Strategy:  
A Goal-Framing Perspective on the Drivers of Value Creation 
 
 
2013-6 Nicolai J. Foss, Jacob Lyngsie & Shaker A. Zahra: The Role of External 
Knowledge Sources and Organizational Design in the Process of Opportunity 
Exploitation 
 
2013-7     Stefan Linder & Nicolai J. Foss: Agency Theory. 
